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Abstract—CIS Controls is a set of 20 controls and 171
sub-controls that were created with an idea of having
a list of something to implement so that organizations
can increase their security. While good in theory, it is
a big question of how viable this approach is in practice,
and does it really help. There is only a minor number
of critical views of CIS Controls and since CIS Controls
are marketed by two very influential organizations they
are very popular. Yet, there are alternatives published by
ISO, NIST and even PCI consortium. In this paper we
critically assess CIS Controls, assumptions on which they
are based as well as validity of approach and claims made
in its favor. The conclusion is that scientific community
should be more active regarding this topic, but also that
more material is necessary. This is something that CIS and
SANS should support if they want to make CIS Controls
viable alternative to other approaches.
Index Terms—cis controls, risk assessment
I. INTRODUCTION
CIS Controls is a name for a set of 20 controls that
are marketed as having the best ratio between resources
spent on security protection and gains achieved by low-
ering the risk of being compromised. CIS Controls are
heavily marketed by Center for Internet Security which
is the owner of those controls, and SANS Institute that
initiated the creation of 20 critical security controls and
had ownership rights for some time under the name of
20 critical security controls.
Due to marketing push by CIS and SANS, on the
Internet there are a lot of materials available related to
these controls, including two courses offered by SANS
SEC566 [1] and SEC440 [2]. In general, these materials
largely explain what CIS Controls are, are copies of
information available from the documents produced by
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CIS [3], or deal with how to implement those controls
in some environment.
In the same time, it is very hard to find critical review
of CIS Controls in general, and the scientific scrutiny
regarding CIS Controls is missing. This is worrisome for
two reasons. The first one is the obvious ignorance by
scientific community of something used very intensively
in practice, and the second reason is the simple fact that
no technology is a silver bullet regarding security. To
make a proper decision every decision maker must have
a balanced view on the technology, solution or whatever
he or she prepares to use.
The goal of this paper is to provide a critical view
on CIS Controls and try to place them within the whole
ecosystem of different controls, and security governance
in general. We are not going to analyze specific technical
aspects of the controls, as this warrants a paper for
itself, but instead we’ll analyze surrounding claims made
about CIS Controls in different documents, assumptions
underlying CIS Controls, and the validity of the approach
taken by CIS Controls to secure IT systems. Finally,
we’ll also give some recommendations regarding how
to improve identified shortcomings and also give some
pointers of potential work that can be done by scientific
community.
The paper is structured in the following way:
• Section II gives an overview of CIS controls, its
history and related documents that form a security
framework.
• Section III critically analyzes claims that can be
found in the literature regarding CIS Controls.
• Section II-C compares CIS controls with other
available controls and security frameworks.
• Section IV lists what should be done in order for
CIS Controls to become more credible.
II. CIS CONTROLS
In this section we give a short overview of CIS
Controls. We are not going into depth since it is not
necessarily for the understanding of the rest of the paper.
Only necessary basics are covered.
A. Overview
CIS Controls are defined and described in a document
published by Center for Internet Security [4]. At the
time this paper was written the latest version was 7.1.
published in April, 2019. CIS published several other
guides in which they detail the application of CIS
Controls in some specific environments, like in cloud
[5], Internet of Things [6], etc. But we will ignore those
as they are not important for the main point of this paper.
Each of 20 CIS Controls is further subdivided into
sub-controls, and in total there are 171 sub-control across
all 20 controls. The 20 controls are divided into three
groups, i) basic, ii) foundational, and iii) organizational.
Since the number of sub-controls is quite large and it is
hard to expect that they are fit for everyone, starting from
version 7 of CIS Controls specification, implementation
groups were introduced, three groups in total. In essence,
the idea is that the smallest enterprises implement only
implementation group 1 while the largest enterprises
implement all three implementation groups.
The basic idea behind CIS Controls is that there is
so much information available on the Internet regard-
ing protection of information systems that it become
contra-productive, basically making things worse, i.e.
less secure. This is what CIS in documents specifying
controls calls fog of more [4]. So, the approach taken
to remedy this situation is to have a single source of
information with cut-down version of proposed controls
to be implemented.
B. History & Development
The only source of information about development of
CIS Controls is a SANS Institute Web page that contains
narrative about its history [7]. Searching on the Internet it
is possible to find other sources too, like e.g. [8] which
is very high in Google search results, but all of them
basically repeat information from the SANS Institute
Web page. CIS Controls had a fore-funner but it was
done for the US Government by the US Government
and thus it was not publicly released.
CIS Controls started as an initiative by CIS and SANS
when they contacted NSA with a proposal to develop
cut-down version of controls that will stop and detect
most attacks in existence. In due course a number of
companies and institutions joined the initiative started
by SANS and CIS. Finally, in 2009. the first version of
CIS Controls was published. The current version is 7.1
published in April 2019 as controls are reviewed on an
annual basis.
The initial ownership on CIS Controls had SANS
which called it 20 critical security controls but trans-
ferred it to Council on Cyber Security (CCS), and finally
in 2015 to Center for Information Security [9].
In the historical overview of development of CIS
Controls, SANS gives a certain number of claims in favor
of CIS Controls, but which are of dubious value. We’ll
get to that later in the paper.
C. Other Frameworks
CIS Controls are not the only catalog of controls that
can be found on the Internet. There’s ISO 27001 [10],
NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5 [11], NIST
Cyber Security Framework v1.1 [12], and PCI-DSS [13].
ISO 27001 is part of the ISO 27000 series which is a
comprehensive framework for security management, thus
something much larger than CIS Controls. In Appendix
A of ISO 27001 there are total of 114 controls grouped
into 14 clauses [10].
NIST Special Publication 800-53r5 which is in draft
status has 294 controls grouped into 20 categories. This
is twice more than the number of sub-controls recom-
mended by CIS.
PCI-DSS was created by card companies and, unlike
others, is specific to financial industry. It is created with
a specific purpose to protect cardholder data. So, it’s
narrower in scope than CIS Controls, and especially
other frameworks.
The key difference between CIS Controls and other
frameworks is that CIS Controls are something you
should implement, while all the others are something
you choose from based on risk assessment you’ve done.
In other words, in case of CIS Controls someone already
did risk assessment for you, have chosen controls to
implement and then handed over the list to you.
D. Related Work
To the best of author’s knowledge, the only critical
view on the CIS Controls is a blog post written by
Ben Tomhave in 2011 [14]. The key claims of his post
regarding CIS Controls are:
1) they’re not controls,
2) they’re not scalable, and
3) they’re designed to sell a product.
The first claim revolves around the somewhat philo-
sophical question of what is control and control state-
ment. The author believes that for something to be
control it has to be actionable, i.e. stated in such a
way to allow someone to do something specific or to
perform some action. Based on that premise the author
argues that CIS Controls are actually not controls but
wish list. The second claim is about company size, i.e.
that those controls are not applicable to companies of
all sizes but only for the largest ones. The basis for
such thinking is, for example, Data Loss Prevention
suggested by CIS Controls is supposedly not applicable
for everyone. Finally, in the third claim Tomhave argues
that the 20 critical controls advocate specific products,
and even specific vendors.
In the same post Tomhave also draws attention to the
fact that CIS Controls miss policies, governance and risk
management approach.
III. CRITICAL VIEW ON CIS CONTROLS
We can analyze CIS Controls from several different
perspectives. The first one is related to the whole idea of
having certain number of selected controls that everyone
uses to improve security. This is done in subsection
III-A. Related to the idea of having a specific number of
controls itself are assumptions, implicit and explicit, and
context for development of CIS Controls. This analysis is
presented in subsection III-B. The third view concerns
with question on how the controls were selected, i.e.
what was the process used to determine which controls
are better then the others. This is done in subsection
III-C. Finally, the fourth view is about the claims made
by CIS and SANS in favor of CIS Controls. Those are
analyzed in subsection III-D.
Note that it is also possible to analyze controls them-
selves, as well as recommendations given. But this has
been left for future work.
A. Validity of CIS’ Approach to Security
By validity of CIS’ approach we mean three different
things.
1) Governance: CIS Controls started as an idea of
selecting a certain number of controls that have the best
ratio of resources invested into implementing controls
and security gains achieved, i.e. you would take the list
and start to implement everything on the list starting
from the first one and finishing with the last one.
The problem with this approach is how useful it is in
practice with respect to the governance of the security.
To illustrate, let’s say you were named CISO in some
company and your task it to make it secure. CIS Controls
were made with an assumption that you, as a CISO, don’t
ask anything but immediately start with implementing
controls. But, as CISO, your first task would be to
assess current state of the security, which is done via
risk assessment process. This is in a contradiction with
CIS Controls initial idea as they assumed they did risk
assessment for you.
Risk assessment is something very dependent on par-
ticular context, and there’s no way to have anything
even remotely resembling universal risk assessment, i.e.
having something that will be reusable. It’s always nec-
essary to adjust to specific environment. And, actually,
the document about CIS Controls is specific about that
[?]:
But this is not a one-size-fits-all solution, in
either content or priority. You must still under-
stand what is critical to your business, data,
systems, networks, and infrastructures, and you
must consider the adversary actions that could
impact your ability to be successful in the
business or operations. Even a relatively small
number of Controls cannot be executed all
at once, so you will need to develop a plan
for assessment, implementation, and process
management.
In other words, what this quote says is that you
still need to do a risk management, and in particular
risk assessment process. Finally, in April 2018, CIS
introduced CIS RAM [15] which means that the whole
CIS Controls initiative was back on what it tried to not
be, i.e. risk management process.
With all this development in the CIS approached other
frameworks, most notably the ones specified by NIST.
2) Target Users: It is unclear to whom are these
controls targeted, small, medium or large enterprises.
The fact is, those are vastly different, at least small and
medium enterprises on one hand and large enterprises on
the other hand. This was, in some sense, also recognized
by CIS which published a separate white paper detailing
implementation of CIS Controls in SMEs [16], but also
by introducing implementation groups in the version 7
of the specification.
The bigger the organization is, the more planning and
prioritization is necessary. Planning and prioritization
is a direct consequence of performing risk assessment.
Furthermore, to implement controls it is necessary to
have appropriate management structure which, with a
number of users, increases. CIS doesn’t say anything
about that, so this suggests that CIS Controls aren’t fit
for large enterprises.
It could be argued that in large organizations there are
already such governance structures and that in such cases
they could use CIS Controls and manage the process.
The problem with this argument is that, if there are
already appropriate governance structures, they probably
already know what to do, and besides, in such cases
maybe ISO 27001 is more appropriate to be used. Not
to mention that in such cases there are probably no
problems with fog of more.
B. Assumptions underlying CIS Controls
CIS Controls document is contradictory in that it lists
security controls that you can implement. And, in order
to be able to do so, risk assessment had to be performed
by the people and organizations developing CIS Con-
trols. Namely, they assessed which vulnerabilities are
the most critical ones, and they then suggested which
controls should be applied to lower the risk.
But then it warns you that,
... this is not a one-size-fits-all solution, in
either content or priority. You must still un-
derstand what is critical to your business, data,
systems, networks, and infrastructures, and you
must consider the adversary actions that could
impact your ability to be successful in the
business or operations. Even a relatively small
number of Controls cannot be executed all
at once, so you will need to develop a plan
for assessment, implementation, and process
management.
In other words, it allows you to skip over risk as-
sessment process, and to jump straight into risk control
part of risk management process, and in particular into
reduction of the risk. But then, it suggests to you to
develop a some kind of a plan, which requires at least
some steps from risk management process.
We have several problems there. The first one is that
CIS Controls document in the same time gives you
controls to implement and warns you that you still need
to assess your security. So, if implemented properly, how
are CIS Controls different that other risk management
approaches that come with catalog of controls? The
second problem is related more to how people behave,
that is, they don’t read fine print. In other words, many
people/organizations will start to implement controls,
without knowing is that good for their specific situation
or not. CIS guide for SMEs [16] goes even further than
that, it suggests using someone within the company that
is otherwise not related to security to guide the process
of control implementation. This makes thing even worse
because security shouldn’t be done by the people not
knowing security, and without proper governance struc-
ture - no matter how thin.
Also, quite explicit assumption is that you, as someone
taking care of security, are lost in lot of information,
i.e. fog of more. This is actually debatable, since we
might ask, if you, as a professional, are lost in lots
of information then are you professional at all, at
least security professional? Namely, one of the skills
professionals have is to know what is important and
what is not, and more importantly, to build their own
methods and processes by which they work. So, fog
of more doesn’t sound like a real problem, at least not
for security professionals. Especially it doesn’t sound as
right approach to solve it by giving people something
simple instead of trying to teach them how to handle
that situation.
Anyway, turns out that CIS Controls could be ben-
eficial to some small number of companies that for
whatever reason can not afford security personnel (in-
house or out-sourced) but need to deal with security
issues. At least that was the case until CIS published risk
management methodology [15] which potentially made
CIS Controls harder for use for such companies.
C. CIS Controls Development Process
As we already stated, the only source of information
about the development of CIS Controls available is a
document describing how CIS controls were developed.
Unfortunately, that is far from enough for any objective
evaluation of CIS Controls. Furthermore, there is a
number of claims and arguments made in favor of CIS
Critical Controls which are of dubious value. We review
them in the next subsection.
What is known about development process is the
following [7]:
1) We know a large number of organizations and
people participated.
2) Participants discussed a lot about which controls
to include.
3) There was a period of public consultations on
which over 50 comments were received.
The main argument for CIS Controls is given by
emphasizing that a large number of high-profile organi-
zations participated in the development, like UK’s CESG
and CPNI, the DoD chief computer network architect,
etc. This is a great example of appeal to authority
argumentation [17]. No serious technology should be
based on who did it, but on how it was done. In this case,
more transparency in how things were organized, what
decisions were made, who did what, and so on would
be much more useful that enumerating participants.
When speaking about large number of people and
organizations participating in the development of some-
thing the question that arises is how they aggregated data
they received from participants.
To conclude, no written trace of development activities
is available, at least not publicly. This is problematic and
should be corrected by publishing working papers as well
as reports that will allow scrutiny, and validation, of the
process and its outcomes.
D. Claims made about CIS Controls
When controls were selected and prioritized during
development of CIS controls, the guiding principle was
that no control should be made a priority unless it could
be shown to stop or mitigate a known attack [7]. The
question that immediately pops up is, what is regarded
as a known attack? Attacks are different, and have their
own specifics. So, knowing attack at one organization
doesn’t mean we are immediately knowing attacks in
some other organization. What is probably meant by the
phrase known attack are techniques and tactics [18] that
are used to perform attack which are much more stable
and common.
Next claim about CIS Controls is that it is the best
practice [4]. To analyze the validity of this claim let’s
start with the definition of the term best practice. Ac-
cording to Merriam-Webster best practice is defined as
[19]:
a procedure that has been shown by research
and experience to produce optimal results and
that is established or proposed as a standard
suitable for widespread adoption
So, in order for something to be regarded as best
practice, research and experience has to show that it
produces optimal results. There’s no research regarding
CIS Controls, so we are left with experience. On the
other hand, the only experience available are anecdotal
claims made in some of the documents promoting CIS
Controls. There are no documents recording experiences
and that makes this claim hard to fact check. So, it is left
as an open question if CIS Controls are best practice, or
not.
Yet another claim about the usefulness of CIS Con-
trols, which additionally might support claim of being
best practice, is the following one [7]:
In June 2012, the Idaho National Laboratory,
home of the National SCADA Test Bed, of
the U.S. Department of Energy, completed a
very favorable analysis of how the CIS Critical
Controls applied in the electric sector as a
first step in assessing the applicability of the
controls to specific industrial sectors.
It is very hard, almost impossible to find source of
this claim. Additionally, what is meant by favorable
analysis? How can that be checked, and validated by
doing the same analysis by someone else?
There are also another claim in favor of CIS Controls
[4]:
In 2009, the U.S. Department of State validated
the consensus controls by determining whether
the controls covered the 3,085 attacks it had
experienced in FY 2009. The State Department
CISO reported remarkable alignment of the
consensus controls and the State Department
actual attacks.
This claim opens up more questions than it manages to
give answers. How this validation has been performed?
What were results for each one attack? What kind of
attacks were those? How severe they were? What does
alignment mean? How was alignment measured to be
able to state that there is remarkable alignment? No data
has been published, and thus nothing can be checked
about these claims making them nothing more then a
marketing speak.
Next, there is a statement about reduction of vulnera-
bility based risk which CIS Controls allow [7] which is
widely copied around (e.g. few top results from Google
search [20][21][22]):
With a very rapid achievement of a more
than 88% reduction in vulnerability-based risk
across 85,000 systems, the State Department’s
program became a model for large government
and private sector organizations.
This quote, and specific numbers mentioned, open up
a number of questions. First, what is vulnerability-based
risk? We might speculate that it is risk calculated only
based on known vulnerabilities, but it would be better
that this is clearly stated. Next, question is how did they
calculate or measure this reduction? Did they analyze all
85,000 systems, and if so, how? To do anything across
such a large number of systems is very demanding. Not
to mention that knowing what is there is also demanding.
To conclude, it is clear that a number of claims is
made in favor of CIS Controls, yet none of these claims
can be independently verified. Also very important is that
security is a fast moving field, what was valid few years
ago, doesn’t have to be valid today. So, even though CIS
has annual reviews of CIS Controls, all the claims about
it are not revalidated.
IV. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE
So, it is obvious that further work is necessary that
will evaluate true usefulness of CIS Controls. But, we
should be clear from whom we might expect objective
evaluation. For example, there are case studies available
on the CIS Web page [23], but all of them are primarily
marketing type of materials meant to persuade someone
to use CIS Controls. There is one report written as a part
of GIAC (GCCC) Gold Certification in 2016 [24], but it
is also not enough.
We argue that more scientific analysis is necessary in
order to make CIS Controls more viable alternative for
making systems more secure. To get to that conclusion it
is necessary to analyse incentives of stakeholders in the
ecosystem built around CIS Controls. The stakeholders
in this system are:
• Center for Internet Security (CIS) – who has own-
ership of CIS Controls,
• SANS – who started work on CIS Controls and also
gives courses that teach CIS Controls,
• solution vendors – that offer solutions for the im-
plementation of CIS Controls, and
• users – who implement CIS Controls in order to
protect themselves.
For each stakeholder, the following questions should
be asked:
• What they can gain/lose by criticizing CIS Con-
trols?
• What they can gain/lose by ignoring CIS Controls?
• Do they have incentive to thoroughly analyze CIS
Control benefits?
No stakeholder has an incentive to contradict validity
and usefulness of CIS controls, or to say they are no
better then other approaches. CIS and SANS started
everything and to suddenly claim it doesn’t work would
be disastrous for them. In addition, SANS has very ex-
pensive courses built on CIS Controls. Solution vendors
will happily sell anything customers believe works, and
have absolutely no incentive to say it doesn’t help, or that
it helps a lot less than people think. Users might be an ex-
emption, but people tend not to criticize something they
did (otherwise, they did it for no purpose). Also, users
tend to rely on vendors’ opinion and what they can find
on the Internet. Finally, users tend to believe authorities
and seek protection from authorities. Namely, if incident
happens even though CIS Controls are implemented, it
will have repercussions less likely since everybody is
doing it.
The conclusion is that CIS Controls have to be val-
idated by someone not having a stake in them, and
that ones are scientist that should perform scientific
analysis. But scientist can not analyze something that
is not described, so scientist should be given access to
specific CIS Controls implementations, or at least there
should be better case studies published.
So, the following work is necessary to perform in
order to make CIS Controls more credible:
• Papers describing experience/case-studies with the
implementation of CIS Controls
• Describe context in which CIS Controls were de-
cided to be used
• What controls and in which order were they imple-
mented?
• How well were they implemented? What problems
were encountered?
• How effective they are? Were there breaches?
• Surveys and reviews of experience papers
• Synthesis and generalization of results presented in
the case-studies
• Critical assessment of experience/case-studies pa-
pers
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
CIS Controls started as a quest for the simple solu-
tion that will solve majority of security problems for
everyone. The solution should be preferably plug-and-
play, or at most “Next-Next-Finish”. And for some time
it was marketed as such even though there was fine
print about knowing your system before doing anything.
But as time progressed, and the whole idea evolved
about having ready-made controls to implement evolved
it ended up being one more risk management solution
with accompanying catalog of controls to be chosen
from, only this time (maybe) somehow reduced.
The fact is that cyber security and information security
are not easy, no matter how much we tried to make
them such. In part this is because they are very context
dependent, which make it questionable if a one-size-fits-
all solution will ever exist.
CIS Controls are heavily marketed by the simple fact
that CIS and SANS are very influential organizations,
and in this marketing certain statements are made that
are vague, can not be checked, or are simply wrong.
In the end, any protection is better than none, but also
not all protections are equally good. So, deeper analysis
is necessary of gains achieved by using CIS Controls
when compared to other options, and in the end when
no protections are used at all in some structured way.
We suggested some tasks that could be done in order to
improve things, but much is on CIS and SANS.
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